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Individual and household based aggregate measures of joblessness can, and do, offer conflicting signals
about labour market performance. This paper introduces a simple set of indices which can be used to
measure joblessness at the household level and which can be used to try to identify the likely source
of any disparity between individual and household-based measures of worklessness. We focus on one
measure that can be decomposed in order to isolate the source of any discrepancy. Built around a
comparison of the actual household jobless rate with that which would occur if work were randomly
distributed over the working age population, we show that in Britain and in certain other OECD
countries there has been a growing disparity between the individual and household based jobless
measures, which we term polarisation. Changing household size in Britain can only account for a quarter
of  the rise in polarisation so that differences between individual and household jobless performance
measures seem to derive mainly from the labour market.  Long established labour market shifts in
employment across gender, age, region and skill explain around one quarter of the change since the
mid-seventies. Yet even within these groups there is considerable polarisation of work across
households.
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1. Introduction
Analysis and examination of labour market data usually relies on information collected on
individuals.  In most cases this information is simply averaged across the economy as a whole to
produce estimates of, say, the unemployment or employment rates.  Jobless measures serve to capture
two, rather different, issues. First, they capture the extent of labour market slack and hence potential
inflationary pressure in the economy. Second, they can be used as a measure of the extent of  social
distress and exclusion. On first inspection, the state of the labour market in a country like Britain looks
healthy.  Britain now has an ILO unemployment rate around 5 per cent, (the lowest for twenty five
years), and an employment rate close to that observed at previous cyclical peaks, which is currently
also one of the highest in the industrial world.  However, this good news is not matched by other
measures of social distress based on household level data.  Poverty and inequality amongst the working
age population are inordinately high, especially among families with children (see DSS 1999). In
addition, there is evidence, (Gregg and Wadsworth 1999), that joblessness is now increasingly
concentrated on certain groups and in certain areas.  This paper examines whether measuring
joblessness at the household level can help reconcile these observations. 
In a series of articles, Gregg and Wadsworth (1996, 1998) show that over the past twenty
years, the pattern of employment in certain OECD countries has become increasingly unevenly
distributed across households. The share of households where everyone is in paid work has grown at
the same time as the share of households where no adult works, so employment is increasingly
concentrated into work-rich households.  This, despite aggregate employment rates, derived from2
individual-based measures of joblessness, that have changed little over the past twenty years, allowing
for cyclical variation. 
The scale of this change, in some countries, has been so large that analysis of labour market
performance using individual level data can reach radically different conclusions to that provided by a
household based analysis, using the same source of information. The current workless household rate
in Britain, for example, is now double that of the late seventies when the aggregate non-employment
rate was  at the same level.  Despite near record high employment rates,  nearly 1 in 5 children in Britain
are growing up in a household where no one works. Households lacking wage income will be more
dependent on welfare payments than households containing a mixture of those in and out of work and
more at risk of experiencing poverty. This in turn has profound implications for the scale of government
welfare finance for a given level of joblessness.  It is also easy to think of equilibrium unemployment
models where the amount of wage pressure could vary with  the distribution of work across households
in a different way to the usual hypothesised effect of  the aggregate jobless rate. In sum, the labour
market now is very different from that of twenty-five years ago, but examination of individual-based
jobless data does not always reveal this. 
 Whilst the rise in workless household numbers is undeniable, some commentators have argued
that the cause is not, primarily, a labour market problem.  Instead the emphasis is placed on the break
up of the traditional nuclear family. More single adult households means a greater likelihood of both fully
employed and no work households in the population at any given employment level.  This raises an
important issue for policy-makers, since the solution to the problem of workless households may differ
across the two scenarios. If the rise of the workless household is largely a social problem stemming
from the growth of smaller households, then there is a need to understand the processes that underlie3
household formation and dissolution. Conversely, if  forces are creating an unequal division of  work
across  households  then  policy  makers  need  to  be  aware  of  the  reasons  why  jobs  are  going
disproportionately to households already benefiting from earned income. 
This paper introduces a simple set of indices which can be used to measure joblessness at the
household level and which can be used to try to identify the likely source of any disparity between
individual and household-based measures of access to work. These measures, we believe, could be
used regularly alongside more traditional measures of labour market performance so as to give a more
complete understanding of the state of the labour market. Built around a comparison of the actual
household jobless rate with that which would occur if work were randomly distributed over the working
age population, we show that  changing household size in Britain can only account for a quarter of  the
rise the workless household rate. The gap between a world where work is randomly distributed and
the actual outcome has grown appreciably over the past twenty years. In short, the household
distribution of employment has become increasing polarised and the origin of this seems to lie primarily
in the labour market.
Having provided formal reasons why jobless measures can diverge across individual and
household measures, we then explore whether this disturbance derives from concentrations of work
between regions, gender, age and skill groups. Since household occupants tend to have many
characteristics in common, any major change  in employment centred on certain demographic groups,
a shift in demand away from the less skilled for example, could help explain the observed polarisation.
We find that differential movements in employment rates seem to play a substantial  role in explaining
the polarisation of work. There remains, however, a large residual polarisation of work within area, age
and education groupings.   This within-group polarisation, is centred mostly on single adult households.4
Section 2 sets out the basic facts underlying the divergence between individual and household
based jobless measures in Britain and other OECD countries. Section 3 considers formally why such
divergences can arise and defines a set of household based measures of joblessness and polarisation.
Section 4 extends these results to the entire distribution of employment across households. Section 5
uses Labour Force Survey data to measure polarisation and decomposes the change over time into the
various competing explanatory components and section 6 sets out some conclusions and discusses the
policy implications of these findings.
2. Household Employment Patterns
We begin with a simple outline of the existing facts on household based measures of
employment. We concentrate on Britain, but present some evidence from several other OECD
countries to show that the issue is not unique to one country. The Labour Force Survey, (LFS), for
Britain contains household identifiers. We can therefore count the numbers of adults employed and the
number out of work, on the ILO definition, in each of the 50,000 working age households in the
sample. A workless household, in our definition, then occurs when all the adult occupants of working
age are out of work. Conversely an all-work household occurs when all adult members are in work.
We confine our estimates to the population of working age, exclude any full-time students living at home
and all  households where the head is retired to try and minimise the effects of educational participation
and retirement on our data. Since we are interested primarily in the diverging signals emanating from
the individual and household non-employment rates, we make no distinction between ILO unemployed
and ILO inactive and simply add the two groups together1. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 document the growth in the proportion of working age workless
households in Britain using LFS data2. Whilst the aggregate employment rate moves over the cycle but5
remains broadly untrended, the share of households where no adult works has tripled since the 1970s.
By 1996, nearly one in five of all working age households were jobless. During the mid-eighties and
early nineties the individual-based non-employment rate falls back, but the household non-employment
rate continues to rise. The two measures give conflicting signals.  Figure 1 and Table 1 also document
the simultaneous rise in the proportion of households where every one is in work. Households
containing a mixture of working and non-working adults are in secular decline.  The share of mixed-
work households has fallen by around twenty points, whilst the share of households where everyone
works has risen from 57 to 64 percent alongside the rise in workless households.
Figure 2 shows that Britain has the third highest workless household rate among OECD
countries, despite having one of the highest employment rates,  (see also OECD 1998). Perhaps most
striking is how small the variation in the workless households rate is across countries, despite large
differences in their employment and unemployment rates. Evidence again, that individual and household
based measures can give conflicting signals about the state of the labour market. Figure 3 shows the
workless rate amongst households with children. The British rate is far higher than in any other nation,
with one in five households with children having no working adult present.
The highest incidence of worklessness is amongst single parents, at  around 50%, (Table 2).
Again, all family types exhibit rises in the numbers of workless households between 1981 and 1996,
even though there was a significantly higher proportion of adults in work in 1996.  The aggregate decline
in worklessness over the late nineties is  reflected across all household sizes. 
Table 3 uses Family Expenditure Survey, (FES), data to confirm that poverty rates are
positively correlated with workless household rates.  This is especially marked for families with children,
where around 90% are poor on conventional definitions3.  Around one half of the non-pensioner poor6
lived in workless households in 1996.  Nor is this state transient. Around 60% of these households
currently have no resident adult who has worked in the last three years.  Policy makers are thus likely
to be non-neutral as to whether polarisation is over producing workless households or all-work
households. Workless households are highly likely to be dependent on welfare payments, to be living
in poverty and have attendant social problems. In what follows we focus disproportionately on workless
households for this reason. 
3. Defining Polarisation
We now consider how best to measure non-employment and hence polarisation at the
household level. We need to be able to assess to what extent the labour market accounts for  changes
in the distribution of work and why individual and household based measures of joblessness can give
conflicting information. To understand why this may occur, consider a simple world of 2 households
each containing 2 adults and a non-employment rate in the population of 50%.  The world in which one
adult is out of work in each household is very different from the world in which both adults work in one
household and no one works in the other. Yet the aggregate non-employment rate in the population is
the same, so that this statistic alone is unable to distinguish between the two outcomes.
Esteban and Ray (1994) have investigated polarisation between groups stratified according to
income.  Our concern is with measuring discrete outcomes on the allocation of work, and not, unlike
Esteban and Ray and the income inequality literature in general, with a continuous variable.  By
focussing on the share of work in each household, we are not faced with the endogeneity problem of
Esteban, Gradin and Ray (1999) in classifying a continuous variable, (income), into discrete groups in
order to measure polarisation. We would like therefore a measure that focuses on discrete outcomes
but that can be readily decomposed, is scale invariant, satisfies the principle of population and the7
principle of transfers, all axioms required of inequality measures outlined in Cowell (1995).  
One simple measure of polarisation that accords with most of these axioms, and alluded to by
Esteban and Ray (1994), is simply to calculate the proportion of households containing a mixture of
working and non-working adults, 
M = 3h Mixed  / 3h   h = 1, 2 ... H  Households (1)
Any fall in this proportion must lead to increases in either the all-work or the no-work groups or both.
This is a useful statistic and is easy to calculate.  However, it does not lend itself readily to further
decomposition. For example if changes in the share of households containing different numbers of adults
were thought to be important, this would not be picked up in an index which measured the mixed work
household rate in each household type i, mi, multiplied by the share of each household type, si, 
M = 3i simi , since this is necessarily zero for all households containing only one adult. Moreover, as
we show below, a falling mixed work rate need not, in itself imply a divergence between the signals
emanating from the household and individual based non-employment rates and the measure does not
make explicit the link between the individual and the household rates. Furthermore, this measure does
not imply whether the polarisation results in more workless or more all-work households and, as noted
above, policy makers are likely to be disproportionately concerned with the former.
The sociological literature on segregation (see for example Duncan and Duncan (1955))
provides some guidance on how to construct indices of disparity. The Duncan segregation index,
adapted to our purposes, would take the form, D = ½ 3i | ai  - wi | , where ai is the proportion of all
work households and wi is the proportion in group i where no one is in work. This is, however,
unsuitable. In  households containing more than one adult, there is a mixed work group, the existence
of which invalidates the dichotomy required to calculate any such index. The index reduces to the8
proportion of mixed households in each group. Similarly, the turbulence index used to outline the extent
of labour market “mismatch”, T = ½ 3i | )( Ni /N) | , where Ni is the share of employment in group
i, (see Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1990) ), does not readily lend itself to the measure of the
distribution of work within household types.
One way forward is to undertake standard shift share analysis on the changing proportion of
workless households disaggregated by different household types. Let the actual household non-
employment rate be written as the simple weighted average of the non-employment rate in each
household type, w = 3i siwi  , where si is the share of type i in the population of households and wi is
the proportion of household type i where no one is in work. In this way it is possible to decompose the
total change in the workless household rate into within and between household components and an
interaction effect. 
) Workless = 3i )siwi =  3i )siwi
0 + 3i si
0 )wi +  3i )si)wi  (2)
where the zero superscript denotes base year values. The larger the within-group component the more
likely it is that some form of labour market failure is the dominant explanatory factor4.  Whilst ultimately
providing an answer to the source of any workless household growth, this approach again does not
contain any element of how divergent are the individual and household workless measures.  Yet for
policy, this dimension is important to try to estimate.
Consider instead an alternative means of examining the distribution of work. As a  benchmark
we use the counterfactual workless household rates that would occur if work were randomly distributed
in the population, so that each individual had the same probability of being out of work, given by the
aggregate non-employment rate in the population at time t, nt. In this case the probability of observing
a single adult household out of work would also equal the individual non-employment rate, but the9
probability of a two adult household being out of work would be the square of the non-employment rate
and that of a three adult household the cube of the individual non-employment rate.
Pr (Workless/1 Adult) = nt , Pr (Workless/2 Adult) = nt*nt, Pr (Workless/3 Adult) = nt*nt*nt  
Let household type now be defined by the number of resident adults, so that the predicted workless
rate for a household with i adults at time t is then given by 
  pit = nt
i (3)
It follows that, ignoring time subscripts, the aggregate predicted workless household rate is the weighted
average of these rates, where the weights are again the shares of the relevant household type in the
population.
   = 3i sipi  = 3i sini       (4) w
^
Our definition of polarisation is then the difference between the actual and predicted  household rates5,
that is the extent to which there are more workless households than would be predicted by a random
distribution of employment across all working age adults. 
Polarisation = Actual - Predicted = w -  = 3i siwi -  3i sini = 3i si(wi - ni)  (5) w
^
This gives us a cardinal measure, in percentage points, of the diverging signals from household and
individual-based jobless statistics. The larger the value, the greater the extent of polarisation. A negative
value indicates that work is distributed such that there are fewer workless households than merited by
a random draw. The upper and lower bounds of this measure vary with the level of non-employment
and with changes in the relative shares of each  household type.  At the limit where work is randomly
distributed, the predicted and actual workless household rates are identical and polarisation must go
to zero.  These calculations can also be replicated for each household size type in order to see which10
groups have experienced the most polarisation. From the above the following observations hold.
Proposition 1: The actual workless household rate will rise further if jobs are disproportionately lost
in single rather than multiple adult households. 
This is because the set of work/no-work combinations in a household containing i adults is 
No. (Work/No Work Household Combinations) =  (2)i (6) 
Assuming, for simplicity, that each of these outcomes is equally likely then a job lost in a single adult
household increases the workless numbers by one; a job lost to an individual in a 2 adult household has
a two in three chance of raising the workless household numbers and there is a three in seven chance
of a job is lost by an individual in a 3 adult household6.  Hence changes in the measure of polarisation
stem from how unevenly work is distributed among multi-adult households and from whether single
adult households are losing work relative to multi-adult households. 
Proposition 2: A rise in the share of households containing one adult will raise the predicted workless
household rate more than a similar size increase in the share of households with more than one adult.
To see this, let the cumulative share of household types Si =   so that (4) can be written j
j
i
s
=
￿
1
   = 3i (Si -  Si-1 )ni  =  3i Si (ni - ni+1) =  3i Sini (1- n)  (7)  w
^
and hence d /d S1 > d /d S2 > ... d /d Sn  since n1 > n2 > .... nn . w
^
w
^
w
^
Proposition 3: the individual non-employment rate and the workless household rate need not move at
the same rate or in the same direction over time
This follows directly from the arguments above. If, as in Britain during the last two recoveries, job
creation is skewed toward multiple adult households then whilst the individual non-employment rate will11
fall, following (6), there may be little impact on the workless household rate. Given the workless
household rate 3i siwi , then if for example, dw1/dn ￿ dw2/dn, depending on the size of the relative
household shares, si, this is sufficient to generate a differential response in the rate of change or even
in the direction of change of the workless household and non-employment rates7. Equally, a within
household-type explanation of the same event would suggest that mixed work households, benefit
disproportionately from an upturn. New jobs go mostly to households containing a mixture of working
and non-working adults rather than to workless households of whatever size.  We return to this issue
in the next section.
Decomposition of  Polarisation 
We now proceed to decompose changes over time in both the predicted and polarisation
measures in order to explore the source of any disturbance. To examine the change in the predicted
workless household rate over time, we use a shift-share breakdown
)  = 3i )sini  =  3i )sini 0 + 3i si
0 )ni  +  3i )si)ni   (8) w
^
where the three terms capture the impact of changes in family structure holding employment rates
constant at their base year values, changes in aggregate employment holding household type constant
and an interaction effect, respectively. Hence between any two dates the predicted component can be
attributed to changes in family structure and changes in labour market performance as measured by the
aggregate employment rate.
Since changes in household shares also affect our measure of polarisation we decompose the
change in polarisation as
 )(w - ) = 3i )si(wi - ni) = 3i )si(wi - ni)0 + 3i si
0 )(wi - ni) +  3i )si )(wi - ni)  (9) w
^12
where the first term is the between household type component, the second term measures the within
household type component and the third term is an interaction effect.  This tells us whether the change
in polarisation is due to shifts in household structure towards family types who tend to have lower
employment probabilities, (term 1 on the right hand side of (9)), or due to employment opportunities
worsening amongst all family types, (term 2). Term 2 can also be split into whether the within household
component is strongest amongst single adult or multi-adult households. 
Disaggregating By Characteristics
We next compare actual and predicted values by allowing the predicted individual  non-employment
rates to vary by gender, age, qualifications and region. This allows us to see whether the major shifts
in the pattern of employment across regions, skill and age groups over the last thirty years lie behind
the observed polarisation of work.  We wish to know whether members of workless households have
common characteristics that make them more likely to experience joblessness. For example, whether
they are older, less qualified or more likely to live in low employment regions. Since the predicted rate,
nk
i, is now based on the average non-employment rate in group k, the predicted and actual rates for
group k will converge the more disaggregated the population on which nk
i  is based.  The degree of
disaggregation used is, of course, arbitrary but does allow us to look at the major factors over which
employment is known to vary. This conditional polarisation measure now becomes
Polarisation = Actual - Predicted = w -  = 3ik sikwik -  3ik siknk
i = 3ik sik(wik - nk
i)           (10) w
^
The extent that this count differs from the measure introduced in (5) is attributable to between
employment group variation in employment and any residual polarisation from (10) can be said to be
within employment group polarisation.
Proposition 4: if employment dispersion across any factor lies behind the divergence between actual13
and predicted measures then disaggregating by this variable should reduce polarisation more.
This  follows  directly  from  (4).  Since the average actual rate,  3ik s ikwik, is unchanged by
disaggregation, the better the prediction, 3ik sinki
i, the lower the polarisation measure.  Given 2
variables, X and Y, if the non-employment rate varies widely across different values of X, but is
unchanged across different values of Y, then 3ik sikwik - 3ik siknx
i < 3ik sikwik - 3ik sikny
i.  
This helps clarify the extent to which polarisation rises if either (a) multi-adult household
members have common characteristics across which employment varies substantially or (b) single adult
households have characteristics which are associated with low employment probabilities. Note that
because (a) only applies to multi-adult households, the larger the share of single adult households the
smaller the impact of disaggregation on the polarisation measure. Having accounted for a set of
observable  characteristics,  any  residual  within-group polarisation would suggest that workless
households  form because all members of certain households suffer reduced access to work relative to
others with similar characteristics. 
4. Other Household Work Patterns
When analysing  social distress,  workless households are of primary interest.  However, we
can compile a polarisation measure for the entire distribution of work since the decompositions above
can also be applied to the measure of  the change in the share of households where there is full
employment or a mixture of employed and non-working adults.  This may help us understand why, for
example, as Figure 1 shows, the workless and fully employed household rates have risen together at
certain points over the last twenty years.  
Taken together,  the predicted allocation of  work across households is given by,
(11) ( ) ( ) ( )
^ ^ ^ ^
Dist NoWork MixWork AllWork s n s n n s n i
i
i i
i i
i
i
i i = + + = ￿ + - - - + - ￿ ￿ 1 1 114
which can be compared with the actual rates documented earlier in Figure 1 and Table 1. If the mixed
work rate is constructed as a residual, it follows that the three terms in (11) must add to one.
(12) 1
^
NoWork
^
MixWork
^
AllWork NoWork MixWork AllWork = + + = + +
Proposition 5:  Under a random allocation of work, for any change in the aggregate non-employment
rate, the predicted no work and all work rates will always move in opposite directions, though the size
of the changes are not symmetric.
The first point follows directly from (11), since 
d(ni)/dn = 3i siini-1 > 0 and  d(1-n)i/dn = 3i -sii(1-n)i-1 < 0          (13)
(13) also shows that a given change in the non-employment rate has a non-symmetric effect on the
predicted workless and all work rates, (unless n=0.5).  Over time, these two predicted rates, and
indeed the actual rates, need not move in the same proportion and so changes in a polarisation count
for no work households will vary differ from one based on all work households. This is a good reason
for studying the two household measures, workless and all-work, independently. Note that a positive
polarisation  count  using  the  all-work  household  measure  implies  that  there  are  more  all-work
households than would be predicted under a random allocation of work. 
Proposition 6: Polarisation will rise if the predicted and actual mixed work household rates move in
opposite directions. 
This again follows from (11).  For non-employment rates below fifty percent, any rise (fall) in the
aggregate non-employment rate increases (reduces) the predicted mixed rate, since
d( )/dn = 3i si(-ini + i(1-n)i-1) > 0           (14) Mix
^
The rise in the predicted workless household rate following a negative employment shock reduces the15
predicted number of mixed work households, (term 1 in (14)), but this is more than offset by the
predicted inflow from the fall in the number of all work households, (term 2)8. Yet this is not always
what we observe, as Figure 1 shows.  In Britain at several points over the sample period, the actual
workless household rate rises alongside the all work rate, and the share of mixed households falls when
it should, if work were allocated randomly, be rising. Hence another means of  detecting polarisation
is to compare the change in the actual and predicted mixed rates. If the rates move in the opposite
direction, then one might suspect polarisation.
This is not a sufficient condition for polarisation however, since the individual and household
non-employment rates can give conflicting signals even when the predicted and actual mixed rates are
moving in the same direction.  If, in a recovery, work goes disproportionately to mixed work
households then the individual based non-employment rate will fall faster than the household non-
employment rate and our measure of polarisation could rise.
Proposition 7: A necessary and sufficient condition for a rise in our polarisation measure is that the rate
of change in the predicted mixed work household rate is less than the rate of change in the mixed work
household rate. 
d( )/dn < d( )/dn            (15) Mix
^
Mix
This follows directly from (14). A random allocation of work implies a given level and a given rate of
change in the mixed, or indeed in any of the predicted rates. Any deviation implies polarisation9. Hence
the deviation between the actual and predicted mixed work household rate offers another  measure of
polarisation. However this result brings us back to our original formulation of polarisation, namely the
deviation between a random allocation and the actual outturn. As the patterns of polarisation toward
no work and all work households are not symmetric and we are non-neutral between these two16
outcomes, we analyse  the rise in no work and all work households separately.
5. Results
We now proceed to examine British data in the light of these propositions. We begin, in Table
4 with information on actual workless household rates and our estimates of the predicted rate on the
random basis, using (4), and polarisation, using (5).  We  presents results for the years 1977, 1990 and
1999, when the aggregate employment rate was broadly the same and also at the peak of each
respective cycle, together with the  years 1987 and 1996, when the workless household rate was at
a cyclical high point.  These dates should highlight any secular or cyclical trends.  
In 1977, the predicted workless household rate, based on the random allocation of work,
almost exactly matched the actual rate, so that there was no polarisation. By 1999, despite there being
a similar non-employment rate as in 1977, the proportion of households with no adult in work had risen
by over nine percentage points but the predicted rate rose by just 2.6 points, (column A).  As a result,
the polarisation measure rises to 6 percentage points. Changes in household shares account for the vast
majority of the predicted change and indeed shifts in family structure accelerated in the latter half of the
sample period, so that this explains around one half of the three point increase in the overall workless
household rate between 1990 and 1999, (column B of the bottom panel of Table 4). However for the
sample period as a whole, two thirds of the rise in the workless household rate is unexplained by either
changing household structures or changes in the aggregate non-employment rate.
Figure 4, (upper panel),  tracks the measure of polarisation moves over time alongside the
workless household rate.  Polarisation rises in each recession and continues to rise after the individual
employment rate begins to recover. There are then modest falls in polarisation during the later part of
each recovery. Periods of net job destruction result in larger increases in workless households than17
would be predicted by a random draw across the population. Rapid net job generation reduces
workless household rates by more than would be predicted by a random allocation, but not enough to
offset the losses of the preceding recession.  Since 1996,  polarisation has eased somewhat faster than
during the recovery in the late eighties but still not by enough to undo the cumulative effects from earlier
years.  Table 5 decomposes the change in polarisation into within and between household group effects
using (9). The main source of polarisation is more workless households within all household types,
(column II). The majority of this rise occurs before 1990, since when the between household type
component dominates the, much smaller, rise in polarisation. 
Accounting for Polarisation
Having access to individual survey data we can relax the random distribution of work
assumption and predict household employment probabilities according to the characteristics of the
individuals that comprise them.  Given the gender composition of the household, for example, we can
assign the gender-specific non-employment rate to each member of the household and take the product
to obtain a revised predicted household probability of worklessness. The characteristics we use are the
principal variables known to be associated with differential employment probabilities;  region, (11
groups), gender, age (3 groups; 16-24,25-49, 50+) and education (4 groups; degree, upper and lower
intermediate and no qualifications). We use one characteristic at a time and then combine, giving us a
maximum of 264 non-employment rate cells in any one year. Note that predicted values from a logit
on the probability of the individual being out of work, applied to each member of the household, could
be used here once cell sizes become too small10.
Table 6, (column III), shows that allowing for regional variation in non-employment makes little
difference to the predicted rates. So employment differences across regions are reflected fully in18
workless household rates and do not therefore contribute to polarisation11.  Changes in workforce
composition by gender go a little way toward explaining the change in polarisation, (column IV).
Convergence in male and female employment rates over the last 25 years, falling for men and rising for
women, has a net positive effect on the predicted household employment rate and, because the
predicted rates were lower than the actual rate in the seventies, helps explain the rise in polarisation,
(see also Figure 5). In some households both individuals now work, in others no-one works. Age and
education have a modest impact on the predicted rates, but the interaction of all four factors, (column
VI) does have a more noticeable effect on the predicted rates.  Indeed this disaggregation can explain
around a third of the 6.3 point rise in polarisation between 1977 and 199912. This is consistent with the
notion that older, less educated men in the North are losing work and prime-age women in the South
are entering work, (see Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999, for more detail of these trends). These groups
live in different households, hence polarisation rises.  
One way of assessing the impact of these trends is to calculate counterfactual estimates of what
the workless household rate would be if the cell-specific non-employment rates were fixed at their 1977
values. The final row of Table 6 suggests that the unconditional predicted rate workless household rate
for 1999 based on the 1977  non-employment rate would be little different from the contemporaneous
prediction, (column II).  However, the conditional prediction based on the interaction of age, education,
region and gender suggests that had non-employment patterns, based on these 4 factors, remained as
in 1977, the predicted workless household rate would have been 2.5 points lower than the estimate
using current values, (compare rows 4 and 6 column VI)13. 
However it is apparent from Table 6, (row 5), that only around one half of the 9.1 point rise
in the workless household rate over the period is explained by the interaction of these variables or by19
changes in household size, so that there is a large residual within-group gap. It would seem that within
any group, say older, less educated men in the North, those who are either single or who have non-
working partners increasingly don’t work whereas those with working partners do. 
Polarisation by Household Type
Whilst the analysis so far indicates that most polarisation is within group, this does not reveal
amongst which types has polarisation increased most. One way of beginning to address this issue is to
conduct separate analyses by household size, to assess which types are most affected and contrast any
within-group differences across these households. We divide the population into three groups according
to whether the household contains one, two or more than two adults and present estimates of (4) and
(5) for each household type. We do not use separate non-employment rates for each household type
in the calculating the predicted rates, since we wish to contrast the differential performance of different
household types against a common background. 
Table 7, (and Figure 6), suggest that our earlier finding of no polarisation at the aggregate level
in 1977 held for all household types.  So during the seventies, the random allocation of work
assumption fits the data closely.  Since then, the share of single adult households has grown by 12
percentage points over the sample period, mainly at the expense of the 3 or more adults household
group. Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that this would be expected to increase the aggregate actual  and
predicted workless household rates for a given non-employment rate, but not necessarily polarisation
within each household type. Table 5 showed that polarisation occurred primarily within household type
not from shifts towards those types where polarisation was already strong. Of the 5.1 point rise in within
group polarisation, using the second term in (9) and the information in Table 7,  single adult households
accounted for around half of the within group rise.14   However, workless household rates for all20
household types are increasingly diverging from the rates predicted on the random distribution of work
assumption, so that there is an increase in polarisation for all types over the sample period. Relative
changes across household types over the whole sample period are broadly equal.15 
Interestingly, the single adult share rises most after 1990, when polarisation for this group starts
to fall. In the 1990's polarisation is more of a problem amongst multiple adult households. The main
effect of conditioning on characteristics is, generally, to raise the predicted workless household rates
in multiple adult households, and so increase polarisation, and to reduced conditional polarisation in
single adult households.  So, over time, between-group employment shifts across age, gender,
education and region explain more of the polarisation observed in single households, though, as before,
there remains a substantial within-group component to the workless household rates that can not be
explained by these factors. 
Around a third of  single adult households were lone parents in 1999 who account for 40% of
the rise in the numbers of single adult households since 198316. Since lone parents have low
employment rates, their increasing numbers might  underlie this within employment group deterioration
for single adult households. In order to address this issue, Table 8 and Figure 7 present workless
household and polarisation estimates for the 3 household types, conditioning on the presence of
children17.  Workless household rates for lone parents are higher than for any other group, but have
recovered in the nineties both in absolute and relative terms. The conditional estimates of polarisation
for both single adult groups are always much closer to each other than the unconditional estimates. This
suggests that lone parents have age, education, gender or regional characteristics that make them more
likely to experience worklessness. Using (9) to account for within group polarisation, we estimate that
those without children account for slightly  half of the relative deterioration of employment among single21
adult households since 1983. So it appears that all single adult households have lost ground relative to
other adults with similar characteristics in multi-adult households.
Cross-Country Comparisons
We next look at how polarisation in Britain compares with other counties by adapting  raw data first
published in OECD (1998).  Table 9 shows that Britain had the highest level of polarisation among the
OECD nations surveyed. It has far more workless households given its employment level and family
structure  than  any  other  country.  Some  countries,  notably  Spain  and  Italy,  still  have  negative
polarisation, as was the case in the UK in the 1970's. For these countries negative polarisation is
perhaps a way of coping with low employment rates. High levels of individual joblessness are absorbed
by households containing other employed workers. Since 1985, a number of counties have witnessed
sharp rises in polarisation, Belgium, Ireland, Canada and the Netherlands being the most notable. Only
in Portugal and Luxembourg has polarisation fallen over time. Almost all the countries have experienced
shifts in family structure that produce more workless households. This trend has been strongest in the
UK, and Belgium and weakest in Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.  Ireland and the Netherlands have
had major employment expansions, reducing the predicted number of workless households, though not
by enough to offset the trends generated by changing household structures.
All-Work Households
We next explore the rise of the all-work household  in the same way as for workless
households. Tables 10-13 repeat the decompositions in Tables 4-7 but for all-work households.  Table
10 and the bottom panel of Figure 4 show that in 1977 there were fewer households where all adults
worked than would be predicted by a random distribution of work, a feature which was reversed in the
nineties so that polarisation is also apparent using the all work measure.  Polarisation is at its highest at22
the end of the recession in the early nineties. This suggests that jobs were lost disproportionately during
the recession in mixed work households. The rise in the all work household rate over the sample period
amounts is around 7 percentage points, (column 1). Half of this rise can be predicted by changes in
family structure given the near constant employment rates observed between 1977 and 1999, (column
3).  Polarisation of work across households explains the other half of the change. Note that, consistent
with our predictions, the size of the change in polarisation is different from that estimated using workless
households. Moreover, the bulk of the family structure effects occurred in the 1990s, whereas
polarisation has grown steadily over the entire period. 
We explore the combined effect of individual characteristics within households in explaining any
observed polarisation in Table 12. By the nineties, the level of the all-work household rates can be
largely explained by the random allocation of work prediction.  Conditioning on other observables has
little additional effect. Over time, most of the rise in polarisation can be explained by the combined
effects of changes in employment structures across age, education, region and gender. The net effect
of the recent convergence in the employment rates of men and women, for example, produces more
fully  employed  households  and  so unconditional polarisation in the all-work rate rises.  The
counterfactual calculations suggest that the predicted all-work  rate in 1999 would have been higher
if the 1977 employment rates were in place but the household structure was allowed to vary.  
For an unchanged employment rate the more jobs are skewed towards households already
containing working occupants the more all-work polarisation is likely to increase. When the data are
split by household size, (Table 13), it is apparent that two adult households are much more likely now
to be fully employed, from just over one half of the total in 1977 to two thirds at the end of the nineties.
Moreover, this increase is much more than would be predicted by a random allocation of work, even23
after conditioning on observable characteristics.  Most of this increase in polarisation, for all groups,
again occurs in the eighties. All-work polarisation is much higher amongst single adult households,
though has stabilised somewhat in the nineties.
6. Conclusion
Labour market jobless measures aggregated from individuals can give conflicting signals about
labour market performance compared with jobless measures derived using the household as the basis
of aggregation. A simple focus on individual-based aggregate employment statistics can, and does,
therefore obscure major labour market developments that can have important welfare, budgetary and
efficiency consequences. 
We believe that the simple set of indices used in this paper to measure joblessness at the
household level can also be used to try to identify the likely source of any disparity between individual
and household-based measures of access to work. We would urge that household-based measures of
labour market performance be used regularly alongside more traditional individual based measures of
joblessness. If we wish to calculate the extent to which individual and household based measures of
joblessness are diverging over time then the mixed household rate, or preferably the measure of
polarisation outlined here could be used.  The latter measure has the advantage that it can be
decomposed in order to isolate the likely source of any disturbance.
Using this approach we find that there have been dramatic changes in the polarisation of work
across households in the last 25 years. Only a quarter of  the rise in the workless household in Britain
derives from shifts in household structures toward more single adult households, mostly in the 1990s,
and none from aggregate employment changes.  Polarisation across households accounts for the
remainder of the rise and is partially driven by changing concentrations of employment across areas and24
socio-economic groups.  It seems that less educated and older  men  in the northern regions of Britain
are losing employment whilst better educated, prime-age women in the south are gaining work and
because these people live in different households, polarisation rises. Many of the individual issues have
been explored elsewhere , (see for example Erdem and Glyn, 1999, Wadsworth 2000, on less skilled
men in depressed areas,  Disney, 1999, on older men, Machin and Van Reenan, 1998, on skill biased
technological change and Blundell and McCurdy, 1999, on female labour supply). 
Between group effects are almost entirely confined to the 1980s and account for around a
quarter of the total rise in polarisation. So after accounting for changing employment rates across age,
education, gender and region there has still been considerable polarisation of employment across
households. Within any group, say older men, those who are single or who have non-working partners
increasingly do not work whilst those with working partners do. We believe that such within-group
polarisation of work is likely to be driven by factors which combine to produce differing incentives to
accept relatively low wage entry level jobs18.  The presence of a working partner changes work
incentives profoundly in Britain, (see Gregg et al, 1999).
The cyclical nature of polarisation means that the last few years have seen a small improvement
and, of course, more work to distribute. We are not yet at the peak of this employment cycle.  We will
learn in the next few years whether a sustained tight labour market can significantly reverse the
polarisation of work observed over the past 25 years. Policy initiatives to encourage this could focus
on encouraging inactive groups such as lone parents, older and less educated men and the partners of
men on welfare benefits into work. There is a need to shift the agenda away from a simple focus on
individual based jobless measures as an indicator of labour market performance and social distress.
Perhaps the issues raised in this paper suggest how complementary analysis could proceed.25
1. See Gregg, Hansen and Wadsworth in Gregg and Wadsworth (1999) for some evidence of the
unemployed/inactive composition of workless households.
2. The ONS now has its own series, derived, like ours, from the same LFS source. The main
difference between the two is that the ONS definition of working age households includes any
resident who is working age, whilst our series excludes any household with a head of household
above working age. In our definition students are also excluded. A household with both parents
working and a child over 16 in full-time education counts as a fully working household in our
definition but not in the ONS series, (see Cooper-Green, 2000). Both series exclude households
where any occupant does not record labour force status. The Family Expenditure Survey also has a
broadly consistent definition of a household that starts in the late 1960s but is based on a smaller
sample than the LFS. The data are unweighted in the absence of LFS household weights.
3.  A poor household has less than half mean household income after housing costs equivalised for
family structure. See Gregg, Harkness and Machin, (1999), for the link between worklessness and
poverty in Britain and  Micklewright and Stewart, (1999) for the contrast with the rest of Europe.
4.   Throughout, we assume that household size and labour market performance are independent.
We leave the exploration of the relation between the two factors to future work. Our data do
suggest that changes in the shares of different household types appear secular rather than cyclical.
To the extent that the labour market does influence household size then we will overestimate the
share attributable to households in our decomposition. The polarisation definition used here when
not decomposed is however unaffected by these considerations.
5.  Note that this is not the same polarisation as envisaged by Esteban and Ray (1994) who define it
as a shift in the distribution from the centre to the two lateral masses. Our measure differs from those
favoured by these authors since we are not concerned with the absolute value of the variable under
consideration (in our case work, in their case income).
6. This follows because the set of all possible employment combinations is {1,0} in a 1 adult
household; {0,0; 1,1; 0,1; 1,0} in a 2 adult household and {1,0,0; 0,1,0; 0,0,1; 1,0,1; 1,1,0; 1,1,1;
0,1,1; 0,0,0} in a 3 adult household.
7. For example, net job loss amongst single adult households and net job creation amongst multiple
adult households against a background of net employment growth in the economy could be sufficient
to generate a differential effect direction of the change in the workless household and non-
employment rates.
8.  Note that the sign of the derivative is reversed if the non-employment rate, n, is above fifty
percent.
9.  It is obvious that if the predicted workless rate falls less than the actual rate then polarisation also
rises.
Footnotes26
10.This strategy does however imply that once cell sizes become too small a logit prediction based
on a linear specification, bX,  like OLS, will predict only the mean of the dependent variable and the
mean workless probabilities of each right hand side variable,  not their interactive cell means. This is
analogous to the difference between predictions from the non-parametric and propensity score
techniques in the matching literature. The median cell size in 1977 is 172 with a minimum of 1 and a
maximum of 2429.
11.  This does not rule out the possibility that a finer area disaggregation may have a role to play.
12. The change in polarisation over the period is the difference between columns I and II in row 5.
This gives 9.1 - 2.6 = 6.5 points. Column VI indicates that the predicted rate changes by 4.8 points
over the period allowing for variation by age, education, region and gender, whilst the random
predicted rate rises by 2.6 points. So, 4.8-2.6 = 2.2 points of the gap can be explained by relaxing
the prediction rule.
13. Note that this counterfactual strategy cannot be applied to the actual workless household rate,
since the method is based on individual non-employment probabilities.
14. The second term on the right hand side of (9) indicates that within group polarisation is  
3i si
0 )(wi - ni) = .21*[13.3-1.7] + .63*[2.5–.09] + .11*[2.8–.02]. The first term on the right
hand side of this expression gives the relative contribution of single adult households.
15.  In 1999 the predicted rate for singles is 24.3 points and the actual rate is 53% above this. For
couples the predicted is 5.9 and the actual rate 41% above this and for 3+ adults its 1.4 with the
predicted 171% higher. 
16. The share of lone parent families in the household population rose from 4% in 1981 to 10% in
1999. The share of single childless adult households rises from 14 to 23% over the same period.
17. This information is only available in the LFS from 1983 onward.
18. See Card and Robbins, 1998, Elwood, 1999 for recent North American evidence.27
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Figure 1. Polarisation of Work Across Households, 1975-9931
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Figure 4. Polarisation of Employment Across Households: 32
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Figure 5. Accounting for Polarisation in Workless Households33
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Figure 6. Worklessness and Polarisation By Household Size34
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Figure 7. Workless Households and Polarisation by Presence of Children30
Figure 3. Workless household rate by country for households with children (OECD - 1996)
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Figure 2. Workless household rate by country (OECD -1996)
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Table 1. Workless households in Britain
Workless
households
(working age)
Households where
all adults work
Working age adults
in workless
households
Children in
workless
households
Employ
ment
rate
(000s) % (000s) % (000s) %
(000s)
%
1975 900   6.5 7880 56.7 1230   4.3 - - 76.8
1981 1570 10.9 7480 52.1 2360   7.8 1510 11 72.9
1987 2580 16.5 8470 54.2 3780 11.9 2340 17.5 72.5
1990 2280 14.1 9840 60.7 3140  9.8 2280 14.5 76.9
1996 3320 19.2 10540 60.9 4530 14.1 2880 20.4 73.9
1999 3080 17.2 11320 64 4130 12.7 2620 18.4 76.4
Source: LFS. Notes: - data not available. 
Table 2. Workless households by Family Type
Family type
Single adult Single parent Couple, no
children
Couple with
children
1981 28.3 51.2  4.7  6.2
1985 36.6 59.2 7.1 9.1
1990 31.5 58.4  6.4  5.2
1996 34.8 56.7   7.8  8.3
1999 31.2 51.9 7.7 6.4
Source: LFS.               
Table 3. Poverty rates in workless households
Workless
household
poverty
rate
By family type Proportion of
the poor
living in
workless
households
Single adult Single parent Couple, no
children
Couple with
children
1968 70.8 59.3 81.9 61 75 29.3
1975 62.2 46.9 82.3 41.5 60.4 37.8
1981 62.5 47.4 66.9 40.7 71.2 46.8
1985 69 56.4 73.7 47.3 85.1 58
1990 77.4 68.2 89.7 49.5 84.3 43.2
1996 74.9 60.6 89.1 40.1 89.2 51.2
Source: Family Expenditure Survey36
Table 4. Decomposition of workless household rate in Britain, 1977-99 (LFS)
Workless
Household
Rate   (1)
Predicted Rate
(2)
Predicted given
employment
levels in 1977
(3)  
Predicted given
household
structure in
1977 (4)
Polarisation
(1) - (2)
1977 8.2  8.5  8.5  8.5 -0.3
1987 16.5 11.1  8.9 10.7  5.5
1990 13.9  9  9.2  8.3  4.9
1996 19 12.2 10.7  9.7  6.8
1999 17.2 11.1 11  8.5  6.1
) workless
household rate
) predicted
rate
(A) 
Change  in  (A)
due to
household
structure   (B)
Change  in  (A)
due to
employment
(C)
Change in
polarisation
77-99  9  2.6 2.5  0  6.4
77-90  5.7  0.5 0.7 -0.2  5.2
77-87  8.3  2.6 0.3  2.2  5.8
87-90 -2.6 -2.1 0.5 -2.4 -0.6
90-99  3.3  2.1 1.8  0.2  1.2
96-99 -1.8 -1.1 0.3 -1.2 -0.7
Note: changes in B & C do not add to A due to omission of interaction term       
Table 5. Decomposition of polarisation in workless household rate 1977-99 (LFS)
) polarisation
(I)
Within Household
types
(II)
Between Household
Types 
(III)
77-99  6.4  5.1 0.2
77-90  5.2  4.8 0.1
77-87  5.8  5.4 0.1
87-90 -0.6 -0.6 0.2
90-99  1.2  0.3 1 
96-99 -0.7 -0.8 0.2
Note: changes in B & C do not add to A due to omission of interaction term       37
Table 6. Workless Household Predictions by Characteristics, (Britain)
Actual
workless
household
rate
I
Predicted  by  random
distribution of
employment 
II
Predicted rate allowing employment variation
by:
Region
III
Sex
IV
Age  and
education
V
Region,
sex,  age
quals.
VI
1977 8.3  8.5  8.5  7 8.6 7.2
1983 14.6 11.8 11.9 10.9 12.2 11.3
1990 13.9  9  9.1  8.6 9.8  9.7
1999 17.4 11.1 11.2 11.1 11.8 12
     Change 
99-77 9.1 2.6 2.7 4.1 3.2 4.8
Counterfactual (1977 employment rates)
1999  17.4 11.1 11 10.2  9.1  9.5
Note: values in columns 1&2 may differ from numbers reported in Table 4 because of missing
regional, gender, age or qualifications data.38
Table 7. Polarisation of Worklessness by Household Type, 1977-99
1 Adult 2 Adult   3 Adult
1977
Workless Household % 25 4.5 1.1
Polarisation
Unconditional  1.7  -0.9  -0.2
Conditioned on age,
gender, education and
region
 1.1   1.3   0.3
1983
Workless Household % 38.7  9.7  3.8
Polarisation
Unconditional   9.4  1.1  1.3
Conditioned on age,
gender, education and
region
  6.9  2.7  1.1
1990
Workless Household %  37.8 6.7 2.3
Polarisation
Unconditional  15   1.6   1.2
Conditioned on age,
gender,  education and
region
 11   2.1   1
1999
Workless Household % 36.7  8  4.1
Polarisation
Unconditional 13.3  2.5  2.8
Conditioned on age,
gender, education and
region
10.6  2.5  2.3
Change 1999-77
Polarisation
Unconditional
11.6   3.4   3 
Polarisation
Conditional
 9.5  1.2  2
Source: LFS. Share of 1, 2 and 3+ adult households were respectively .21, .63, .16 in 1977, .25, .58, .19 in 1990 and
.34, .55, .11 in 1999.39
Table 8. Workless Household Rate and Polarisation by Presence of Children and Household
Type, 1983-99
1 Adult 2 Adult   3 Adult
Child N o
Child
Child N o
Child
Child N o
Child
1983
Workless Household % 54.4 34.4  9.7  9.7  4.5 3.2
Polarisation
Unconditional 25.2  5.2   1.1 1.1  2 0.6
Conditional age, 
gender, education , region
 4.9 7.5   2.7 2.7  1.3 0.9
1990
Workless Household %  56.8 31.6  5.8 8.1  2.9 2.1
Polarisation
Unconditional  34.1
 
8.9  0.6 2.9  1.7 0.9
Conditioned on age, 
gender, education, region
 13.5 10.1  1.9 2.4  1.4 0.9
1999
Workless Household % 50.7 31.1  6.6 9.6 5.7 3.2
Polarisation
Unconditional 27.3  7.7  1.1 4.1  4.4 1.9
Conditioned on age, 
gender, education, region
10.6  9.9  2.2 3  2.9 1.9
Change 1999-83
Workless Household  -3.7     -3.1     -3.1 -0.1 1.2  0
Polarisation
unconditional
 2.1  2.5 0 3  2.4  1.3
Polarisation
conditional
5.7     2.4      -0.5     0.3      1.6  1
Source: LFS. Note share of each household type in population were respectively .04, .16, .37, .23, .09 and .10  in
1977 .06, .19, .34, .25, .06 and .10 in 1990  and .10, .24, .30, .25, .04 and .07 in 1999. 40
Table 9 . Decomposition of change in workless household rate in the OECD, 1985-96
Workless
household
rate
1996
(1)
Predicted
(2)
Predicted
given 1985
household
structure
Predicted
given 1985
employment
Polarisation
(1) - (2)
Australia 16.3 12.9 11.8 14.5  3.4
Belgium 24.8 21.3 18.5 24.2  3.5
Canada 19.9 16.5 15.5 17.9  3.4
France 21.9 20.1 18.7 19.4  1.8
Germany 20.7 18 16.3 20.1  2.7
Greece 20.1 19.2 18.6 19  1.9
Ireland 20.4 20.3 20.2 24.7  0.1
Italy 20.7 22.8 22.7 20.6 -2.1
Luxembourg 16.4 19.7 17.1 20.3 -3.3
Netherlands 19.7 16.3 15.3 21.7  3.4
Portugal 13.3 12 11.9 11.3  1.3
Spain 20 22.9 22.7 21.3 -2.9
Un. Kingdom 21.6 14.1 11.3 16.5  7.5
Un. States 15.4 15.5 14.3 17.7 -0.1
)workless
household
rate
96-85
) predicted
96-85   
)  in  (2)  due
to  change  in
household
structure
)  in  (2)  due
to  change  in
employment
) polarisation
Australia  0.9 -0.5 1.1 -1.6  1.4
Belgium  3.6 -0.1 2.8 -2.8  3.7
Canada  2.2 -0.4 1 -1.3  2.6
France  3.1  2.1 1.4  0.8  1
Germany  0.2 -0.4 1.7 -2  0.6
Greece  2  0.8 0.6  0.2  1.2
Ireland -0.5 -4.3 0.1 -4.4  3.8
Italy  3.7  2.3 0.1  2.2  1.4
Luxembourg  1.7  2 2.6 -0.5 -0.3
Netherlands -1.7 -4.2 1.2 -5.2  2.5
Portugal  0.6  0.8 0.1  0.7 -0.2
Spain  1.8  1.7 0.1  1.6  0.1
Un. Kingdom  1.8  0.5 2.9 -2.2  1.3
Un. States -0.4 -0.9 1.3 -2 0.541
Table 10. Decomposition of all work households  in Britain 1977-99 (LFS)
All Work
Household
Rate   (1)
Predicted
Rate
(2)
Predicted
given
employment
levels in 1977
(3)  
Predicted
given
household
structure in
1977 (4)
Polarisation
(1) - (2)
1977 57.9 60.4 59.9 59.9 -2.5
1987 55.5 55 60.7 54.6  0.5
1990 62 61.9 61.2 60.9  0.1
1996 61.4 59.6 63.1 56.7  1.8
1999 64.8 63.3 63.5 59.9  1.5
Change  in  the
all work
household rate
Change  in  the
predicted rate
(A) 
Change due to
family
structure   (B)
Change due to
employment
(C)
Change in
polarisation
77-99  6.9  2.9 3.6 0  4
77-87 -2.4 -5.4 0.8 -5.7  3
87-90  6.5  6.9  0.5  6.3 -0.4
77-90  4.1  1.5 0.7  1  2.6
90-99  2.8  1.4 1.9 -1  1.4
96-99  3.4  3.7 0.4  2.2 -0.3
Note: changes in B & C do not add to A due to omission of interaction term       
Table 11. Decomposition of polarisation in all work household rate in Britain 1977-99(LFS)
) polarisation
(I)
Within Household
Types
(II)
Between Household
Types 
(III)
77-99  4  7.1 -0.3
77-87  3  2.5  0.2
87-90 -0.4 -0.1  0.4
77-90  2.6  3.4  0.2
90-99  1.4  3.5 -2
96-99 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4
Note: changes in II & III do not add to I due to omission of interaction term       42
Table 12. All-Work Households
Actual all
work  rate
(1)
Predicted by
random
distribution 
(2)
Predicted rate allowing employment variation by:
Region Sex Age and
education
Region,
sex, age
quals.
1977 57.9 60.4 60.4 58.2 60.3 57.7
1987 55.5 55 55.1 54.2 55 54
1990 62 61.9  61.9 61 61.8 60.9
1999 64.8 63.3 63.4 62.8 63.5 63
Change
99-77 6.9 2.9 3 4.6 3.2 5.3
Counterfactual (1977 employment rates)
1999   64.8 60.4 63.3 61.2 66.9 63.3
Note: values in columns 1&2 may differ from numbers reported in Table 10 because of missing
regional, gender, age or qualifications data.43
Table 13. Decomposition of all work household rate by Household Type, 1977-99 (LFS)
1 Adult 2 Adult   3 Adult
1977
All Work Rate 74.5 53.4 53.3
Polarisation   unconditional  -2.2 -5.4  8.2
conditional  on  age,  sex,
region, education
 -2.1 -2 10.5
1987
All Work Rate 58.8 56.1 49.4
Polarisation   unconditional -13.9 3.2 11
conditional  on  age,  sex,
region, education
-10.6 2.8 12.7
1990
All Work Rate 62.2 63.2 56.2
Polarisation   unconditional -10 3.6 10.1
conditional  on  age,  sex,
region, education
-11 3.1 11.7
1999
All Work Rate 64 66.9 54.7
Polarisation    unconditional -12.5 8.4 9.9
conditional  on  age,  sex,
region, education
 -9.9 6.7 12.1Figure 2. Workless household rate by country (OECD -1996)
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